(Là. tout de suite, l'Azerbaïdjan s'est activé comme proxy d'Israël pour nuire à la Fédération de Russie. Cela fait des années que les ashkénazes, ancien khazars, vont en Azerbaïdjan rappeler aux gouvernements et au dictateur azéri qu'ils sont le même peuple, eux disent "Nous sommes cousins". Israël a fourni beaucoup d'obus américains à l'armée azérie pour combattre les chrétiens arméniens, de concert avec la Turquie qui a fourni les drones qui ont détruit les chars et l'artillerie de l'armée arménienne. Israël a une base militaire en Azerbaïdjan pour surveiller la Fédération de Russie. La présence d'Israël est derrière les apparence la présence de la city, de la famille rothshild qui retrouve une sphère d'influence dans ce pays.
"Fondée en 1883 par deux hommes d’affaires russes, la Batumskoye Neftepromyshlennoye i Torgovoye Obschestvo (BNITO) exploite un gisement pétrolier à Bakou (actuel Azerbaïdjan), ainsi que le chemin de fer qui le relie à Batoum (devenue Batoumi, en actuelle Géorgie). Ces deux villes appartiennent alors à l'Empire russe.
Au cours des années 1880, la banque d’affaire Rothschild Frères, qui avait participé au financement de la construction de la ligne de chemin de fer, rachète finalement l’affaire et la renomme Société commerciale et industrielle de Naphte Caspienne et de la Mer Noire.
Désormais le siège de l’entreprise est à Paris mais ses deux principales agences sont à Bakou et Batoum. En plus des puits et pipe-lines de naphte et de kérozène, les installations réparties sur divers sites comptent une usine de fer-blanc, une usine de kérosène, des hangars, des estacades (installations sur pilotis), une scierie, un comptoir, un réservoir, des ateliers de remplissage et les logements du personnel.
Archives nationales du monde du travail (France)
Il ne faut pas que la Russie se trompe, l'Azerbaïdjan s'est rangé définitivement du côté des juifs ashkénazes dont son représentant le plus représentatif, la famille rothschild, a toujours cherché à la détruire, ce qui explique la hargne de l'Angleterre et d'aujourd'hui l'AzerbaÏdjan. Ce pays est devenu par la volonté de son seul dictateur ilham aliyev un ennemi déclaré de la Russie. Attendre de recevoir les coups va être une mauvaise politique si la Russie adopte une position attentiste. Cela veut dire aussi que tous les russes doivent quitter l'Azerbaïdjan et que tous les azéris doivent quitter la Fédération de Russie. note de rené)
Why'd Erdogan Decide To Expand Turkiye's Sphere Of Influence Eastwards?
Authored by Andrew Korybko via Substack,
Assad’s downfall set into motion a fast-moving sequence of events that now threatens Russian influence in the South Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia; i.e. its entire southern periphery...
The latest developments in the South Caucasus are connected to the expansion of Turkiye’s sphere of influence eastwards towards the Caspian Sea and thenceforth Central Asia. The unrest in Armenia is driven by the opposition’s concerns that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is prepared to turn the country into a joint Azeri-Turkish protectorate. That could occur if he reaches a deal with them like some have reported to open the “Zangezur Corridor” without allowing it to come under Russian control like agreed.
The Moscow-mediated Armenian-Azerbaijani ceasefire of November 2020 mandates the creation of a Russian-controlled corridor across Armenia’s southern Syunik Province, which Baku calls the Zangezur Corridor, for connecting both parts of Azerbaijan. Russian control would prevent Turkiye from streamlining its military logistics to Central Asia via these means for replacing Russia’s influence there with its own as part of a grand strategic powerplay that autonomously aligns with the West’s agenda.
The second development is directly connected with the first and relates to the newfound trouble in Russian-Azerbaijani relations. President Ilham Aliyev evidently believes that his country has a brighter future as part of a Turkish-led regional order instead of continuing to multi-align between it and Russia. He likely arrived at this conclusion due to the earlier cited reports about the Zangezur Corridor, which could have led to his policy recalibration that then emboldened him to bully Russia for regional prestige.
The catalyst for these developments is the credible possibility that the Zangezur Corridor might open up without coming under Russian control like agreed, which itself was brought about to a large degree by Assad’s downfall and the US’ subsequently changed policy towards the broader region in the aftermath. Turkish influence briefly surged in Syria before spooking Israel, which prompted Trump to bring previously terrorist-designated Ahmad al-Sharaa (Jolani) in from the cold to help manage their tensions.
He met him, encouraged him to join the Abraham Accords with Israel (which the latest reports suggest that Sharaa is considering), and removed the US’ sanctions on Syria. This sequence of events will greatly limit Turkish influence in Syria, but it’s balanced out by the PKK’s disbandment and the possible consolation prize that Trump could have given his friend Erdogan. That might involve him ceding the US’ previously envisaged joint US-French protectorate in Armenia to Turkiye and Azerbaijan instead.
It wouldn’t just be a goodwill gesture on Trump’s part but a pragmatic move since the US’ efforts to turn Armenia into a bastion for dividing-and-ruling the region required subordinating or overthrowing the Georgian government, which repelled several rounds of Color Revolution unrest to this end. This Biden-era failure derailed the US and France’s military logistics to Armenia, hence why it’s better to jettison this deadweight, which can now turbocharge Turkiye’s rise as a Eurasian Great Power at Russia’s expense.
These calculations and associated policy changes, which stem from the black swan event of Assad’s downfall, account for the latest developments in the South Caucasus. Nevertheless, Aliyev didn’t have to abandon Azerbaijan’s Russian-Turkish balancing act nor bully Russia as he clearly ordered his officials to do by raiding Sputnik’s office and beating up other detained Russians. These emotional, short-sighted, and totally unexpected moves inadvertently risk Azerbaijan becoming Turkiye’s junior partner with time.
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